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Abstract 
We investigate, in an experimental setting, the behavior of single decision makers 
who at discrete time intervals over an "infinite" horizon may choose one action from a 
set of possible actions where this set is constant over time, i .e. a bandit problem. Two 
bandit environments are examined, one in which the predicted behavior should always 
be myopic (the two-armed bandit) and the other in which the predicted behavior should
never be myopic (the one-armed bandit) . We also investigate the comparative static
predictions as the underlying parameter of the bandit environments are changed. The 
aggregate results show that the cutpoint behavior in the two bandit environments are 
quantitatively different and in the direction of the theoretical predictions. Furthermore, 
while a a significant number of individual cutpoints exhibit nonstationarity (contrary to
the theory) , the most likely, i .e. maximum likelihood estimates, collection of decision
rules that best explain overall behavior are those that are consistent with the underlying 
theory. 
AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
TWO-ARMED BANDIT PROBLEM 
Jeffrey Banks Mark Olson David Porter 
1 Introduction 
Models of search and learning have become quite pervasive in the field of microeconomics 
in the last two decades. For example, in the area of labor economics the "matching" 
models of Jovanovic ( 1979), Wilde (1979) ,  and Viscusi ( 1979) all have, as their basic 
scenario, a worker who periodically receives information about her current job's true 
characteristics (and hence the wages she can expect) ,  and has the opportunity to remain 
with her current employer or switch to a new job where again information about future 
wages may accrue.1 In industrial organization, Rothschild (1974) models a monopolist 
attempting to learn the true state of consumer demand for its product: by setting different 
prices, the monopolist can gain differential information about demand. lshikida (1992) 
models the decentralized assignment of a digital pipe as a search process where users 
randomly send packets and can cause delays to other users of a communication network. 
Many of these models share an underlying canonical form of individual decision mak­
ing under uncertainty, namely that of a bandit problem. 2 The structure of a typical bandit 
problem has a single decision maker, who at discrete time intervals over an infinite hori­
zon may choose one action from a set of possible actions (i .e. the arms of the bandit) , 
where this set is constant over time. Each arm, if employed in a period, generates a 
reward to the decision maker according to some time-invariant distribution, where for 
each arm there is a set of possible reward distributions known as the types of the arm. 
The decision maker begins with some prior belief about an arm's true type, and any 
additional information would ·be -useful ·in -ascertaining-the best· arm to play. Further, 
it is commonly assumed that the true types of different arms are independent; hence 
knowledge of an arm's type can only be generated by employing the arm for at least a 
single trial. Finally, the decision maker is interested only in maximizing the discounted 
sum of her expected rewards. 
1Cf. Mortensen (1985) for an in-depth survey of these and other search models in labor economics. 
2Cf. Banks and Sundaram (1992b ) . 
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Given the temporal stationarity of the above decision problem, there is an optimal 
strategy for the decision maker which depends only on her current belief (i .e. probability
distribution over types) about the different arms. This stationarity can equivalently be
thought of as a particular type of path independence, in that any two paths of reward 
realizations leading to the same updated belief should generate the same behavior by 
an optimizing individual. Indeed, a result by Gittins and Jones ( 1974) for finite-armed 
bandits shows that an index strategy is actually optimal: for each arm, and for each 
possible belief about that arm's true type, one can assign a number depending only on 
the characteristics of that arm such that an optimal strategy simply prescribes selecting 
in any trial the arm with the highest number.3 
The presence of such an index, while highlighting the stationarity of the solution to 
the decision maker's problem, also renders certain types of comparative statics exercises 
more tractable. For instance, by changing one distribution associated with an arm, or 
more simply by changing the prior belief associated with an arm, one can deduce how this 
alters the index and consequently the index strategy. This stationarity of the optimal 
strategy, along with certain comparative statics hypotheses, provide the motivation for 
our experimental investigation. 
This paper describes experiments in which individuals were faced with one of two 
relatively simple bandit problems similar to the one detailed above. In the first, labeled 
Bandit Problem I below, there are two arms, one of which pays a certain reward, while 
the other generates either a high or low reward, and where the probability of a high 
reward can take on one of two possible values: a "high" probability of generating a high 
payoff (which we refer to as the "good" type) and a "low" probability of generating a
low payoff (the "bad" type) . Thus, we have a two-armed bandit, with one arm having
a single type while the other has two types. In Bandit Problem II there are again two 
arms, but now both arms generate uncertain payoffs. Each arm again produces either 
a high or low reward, and each can be either a "good" or "bad" type, where the true 
types are drawn independently. Therefore the only difference in the arms is the decision 
maker's current belief about each arm's type, i.e. probability she assesses to each arm 
being "good" . 
In both of these problems the predictions implied by the theory alluded to above 
are straightforward: in Bandit Problem I, once an individual has begun playing the arm 
producing the certain payoff, she should remain there forever, since no new information 
is being generated and hence the indices of the arms remain unchanged. Alternatively, if 
she employs the uncertain arm and a high payoff results she should remain with that arm, 
since such a high-payoff should-lead her to-increase-the expected benefits from continual 
play of that arm; that is, the index on the uncertain arm increases. More generally, the 
theory predicts that an individual will have a critical belief about the uncertain arm, 
wherein if her current belief about the uncertain arm being "good" is above this level she 
should employ that arm in the current period, while if her belief is below this level she 
3This result has been extended to the case of a countable infinity of arms by Banks and Sundaram 
(1992b) .. 
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should play the certain arm. Further, this critical belief will be a function of the specific 
reward probabilities, as well as an individual's discount factor and attitudes towards risk. 
In Bandit Problem II, the theoretical prediction is considerably more stark: the opti­
mal strategy for an individual, regardless of the reward probabilities, her discount factor 
or her attitudes towards risk, is myopic; that is, in any period the choice of arm consistent 
with maximizing the discounted sum of expected payoffs is simply the arm that gener­
ates the highest expected one-period reward; or equivalently the arm with the higher 
probability of being "good."4 The intuition behind this result is readily apparent given 
that index strategies are optimal: when there are only two possible types, the index on 
an arm will be increasing in the probability the arm is the "good" ·type; and since in 
Bandit Problem II the arms are identical up to the current belief about type, the indices 
will be the same up to this belief as well. Therefore the arm with the higher probability 
of being "good" will have the higher index, and hence will constitute the optimal choice. 
This predicted myopia in Bandit Problem II is in contrast to the behavior predicted 
in Bandit Problem I, where if an individual's belief is such that either the certain or the 
uncertain arm would generate the same expected one-period payoff, the optimal strategy 
always prescribes the uncertain arm. The reason for this is the "option value" or learning 
aspect inherent in the uncertain arm: even if playing this arm gives the same payoff as 
the certain arm today, it may, in addition, generate information about the arm which will 
be useful tomorrow, information which (by definition) is not generated by playing the 
certain arm. In this sense, then, behavior in Bandit Problem I should never be myopic, 
whereas behavior in Bandit Problem II should always be myopic. 
The experimental literature related to "bandit type problems" has focused primarily 
on the Bayesian updating assumption. Search experiments (e.g. Cox and Oaxaca (1989,
1991) ,  Harrison and Morgan (1990) ) have an agent 's information unaffected by an action 
{search, stop searching} unless the agents belief of the initial prior distribution of rewards 
is misspecified, (e.g. an agent has a prior with support (0, 1 )  but observes an outcome 
of 2). But the models of search (and the experiments that follow them) suppose that 
an agent knows the correct distribution and does not update beliefs. Grether (1992) 
studied Bayesian updating and other heuristics that agents may _use in making decisions 
under uncertainty. His results suggest that "in making judgements under uncertainty 
individuals use different decision rules in different decision situations" and what we want 
to discover as economists are the variables or factors in terms of which decision strategies 
are stable.5 In the experiments we design, the focus is on the stationarity of strategres 
and the comparative static properties of the variables that theory predicts will influence 
behavior for relatively .simple bandit pr.oblems. 
The next section provides a more formal description of our Bandit problems along 
with the predictions and notation we will use in analyzing data from our experiments. 
We then present the experimental design and results. 
4Cf. Banks and Sundaram (1992a) 
5Recently there has been an emerging literature concerning Bayesian learning in games. However, 
this literature focuses on learning how to play a game against others. 
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2 Description of the 2-Armed Bandit Problems 
A decision maker, referred to as the principal, selects an option or arm a E {A, B}, 
available at time t = 1,  2, 3, . . .. After choosing an arm a reward is obtained which is a 
realization from a distribution with a possibly unknown parameter. 
In Bandit Problem I arm A pays a constant amount of 50 each time it is selected, 
whereas option B's reward is uncertain. Specifically, B can be one of two possible types, 
good (G) or not (N), where B's type is the same for each time t but is unknown ex
ante by the principal; let p be the principal's prior belief that B is good. Type G 
generates a reward of 100 with probability g and 0 with probability 1 - g, whereas a 
bad type generates 100 and 0 with probabilities n and 1 - n, respectively, where g > n. 
Assume the principal has a per period utility function, updates her beliefs in a Bayesian 
fashion, discounts rewards by the factor h E (0, 1 ), and seeks to maximize discounted 
expected utility. An optimal strategy exists for this problem; indeed the following simple 
characterization describes the stationary optimal strategy: 
There exists a p* E (0, 1 )  such that at time t if the updated prior Pt concerning
arm B is greater than p* the principal selects arm B; otherwise the principal
selects arm A. 
Bandit Problem II is the same as I, except that now A is structurally similar to B, 
viz. A can be one of two types, G and N (where these are the same possible types as for
B) ,  where the true types of the two arms are drawn independently. Let p� be the prior
belief j E {A, B} is a good type and � is the current belief about j being a good type.
Then the optimal strategy is characterized as follows: 
A (resp. B) is an optimal selection at time t if and only if pf �pf (resp. :::;).
In both Bandit Problem I and Bandit Problem II the optimal decision rule depends 
on the principal's updated beliefs concerning whether the uncertain arm is good or bad, 
which given the setup here is a function of the number of l's and O's an arm has generated. 
To make this updating relatively transparent, in the experiments below, we assume that 
g = 1 - n; under this assumption, Bayesian updated beliefs will depend only on the 
difference between the l's and O's generated. With this in mind, define C(B) inductively 
as follows: 
C(Bo) = 0 
{
C(Bt-1) + 1 if B selected at t-1 and high payoff observed
C(Bt) = C(Bt-1) - 1 if B selected at t- 1 and low payoff observed
C(Bt-1) if A selected at t-1
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For Bandit Problem II 
{ 
C(Bt-1) - 1 
C(Bt) = C(Bt-1) + 1
if A selected at t-1 and high payoff observed or 
B selected at t-1 and low payoff observed 
if A selected at t-1 and low outcome or 
B selected at t-1 and high outcome 
Using C(Bt) we can restate the implications provided in the previous subsection. Let
CTt : C -+ {A, B} denote the strategy based on counts; then
(i) For Bandit Problem I there exists a critical belief cut point 
c E { . . .  , -2, -1.5, -1 , -0.5, O, 0.5, 1 ,  1 .5, 2, . . . } 
{ B if C(Bt-1) > c
CTt = A if C(Bt-1) < c
A or B if C(Bt-1) = c
(ii) For Bandit Problem II the optimal strategy is 
{ B if
CTt = A if
A orB if
C(Bt-1) > 0
C(Bt-1) < 0
C(Bt-1) = 0
The comparative statics for this problem can be computed to find, that the cutpoint 
c will decrease as an individual's discount rate or level of risk aversion increases 
and c decreases as the probability of obtaining a high reward increases. 
In our experiments, we look for stationary strategies, that is, strategies based on 
counts, "more" myopic behavior in Bandit Problem II than Bandit Problem I, and the 
comparative statics properties of cutpoints with respect to discount rates, reward proba­
bilities, and risk aversion. 
3 Experimental Procedures and Design 
3.1 Risk Attitudes and Infinite Horizons 
From the discussion above, we note that the theory implies that the decision rule depends 
on risk attitudes, discounting, priors, payoffs, etc. Parameters such as the probabilities 
and arm payoffs can be induced and/or controlled; controlling discounting and risk is 
more problematic. 
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The lottery procedure of Berg, Daley, Dickhaut, and O'Brian (1986) (hereafter BDDO) 
is sometimes used in experiments to induce specific risk attitudes on subjects. BDDO is 
a generalization of a procedure proposed by Roth and Malouf ( 1979) . The BDDO pro­
cedure induces any prespecified risk preference. It is a two phase decision process. First, 
subjects choose actions that yield "points" which are stochastically related. Second, the 
number of points determine the probability of winning some dollar amount in a lottery. 
Walker, Smith and Cox ( 1986) concluded that the "lottery payoff" /procedure does not 
seem to work for the first price auction. Results by Reitz (1993) suggest that the proce­
dure may work if carefully applied, however, Cox and Oaxaca ( 1993) demonstrate that 
Reitz's results are inconclusive at best. 
For our experiments we use the elicitation technique of Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak 
( 1964) (hereafter BDM) to obtain certainty equivalents to see if there is a correlation be­
tween responses from the BDM procedure and decisions made in the Bandit Problems 
part of our experiments. 
To induce discounted infinite horizons we employ a probabilistic end rule (see Camerer 
and Weigelt ( 1993)) .  That is, after each decision, there is a fixed and known probability 
that the period will end. This procedure has some problems that cause some concern. The 
inability of a subject to understand the probabilistic nature of the end rule (or probability 
at all) is possible. Second, the (small) chance that an experiment will continue for more 
than several hours is not credible. Nonetheless, the ability to understand probability is 
an attribute of the population, as such we realize that only comparative statics may be 
valid with this procedure. Concerning the second issue, the beliefs that subjects may 
have on the actual ending rule, we simply announced a specific ending rule (a maximum 
time for the experiment or a maximum number of periods whichever happens first). 
3.2 Environment Parameters (Treatments) 
For all experiments there was a choice between one of two options (arms) called A and 
B. In Bandit Problem I there is one certain (A) and one uncertain (B) arm and in Bandit 
Problem II both arms are uncertain. If the arm is uncertain then it can be one of two 
types called good and bad, with the prior probability of an arm being good fixed at .50. 
The payoffs of the uncertain arm (high and low) is fixed for all experiments (high=lOO 
tokens low=O tokens). The payoff for the certain arm is 50 tokens. Ten tokens were 
equivalent to 5 cents. 
We induce discounting .in our-.5nfinite" liorizon.-IIlodels .. with the probabilistic end 
rules with either of two probability of continuation values 8=0.80 and 0.90. Each 
subject was advised of this fact along with the average period length before end. These 
values are provided in Table 1 .  
[Table 1 here] 
These "discount rates" were selected because 8 less than 0.8 will have an expected 
length less than 5, and we will not be able to observe long runs. Any 8 greater than 0.9 
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has a high probability of having a large number of rounds and thus there will likely be 
a number of periods that will end from the time limit rule. For h'=0.95, there is an 8% 
chance that the number of trials is greater than 50, and there is almost a 2% chance that 
the number of rounds is greater than 100.  
In addition to the "discount rate," we also vary g,  the probability that the good type 
has a high payoff (recall that we always set n = 1 - g). We use g=.7 and .9. Given
the values of g and 8 we can calculate the optimal critical belief cut point c* for a risk 
neutral player (see Table 2 for a summary) . 
3.3 Experimental Procedures 
Subjects were recruited from the student population at the University of Amsterdam. 
An experimental session was constructed as follows (instructions were computerized; an 
abbreviated set of instructions is supplied in Appendix A):  
(a) Each subject was seated at an individual personal computer, the experimental 
program is started with a predetermined set of parameters and instructions. Each 
subject proceeds through the instructions for the BDM process at their own pace, 
and can practice as much as they like without any time constraints. Each subject's 
experimental session is independent of any other subject's session. 
(b) The subject is then asked to answer 4 different BDM questions in which they are 
paid based on their response/outcome. The specific BDM lottery questions are 
provided in the instructions in Appendix A.  
(c) After the BDM procedure the subject proceeds through the instructions for the 
bandit problem. 
( d) Each experimental session consists of periods and rounds in a period. At the 
beginning of each period the state of each uncertain arm is drawn according to 
the probabilities that are given to the subject at the beginning of the experiment. 
Information concerning payoffs and probabilities was provided to subjects. 
( e) A sequence of rounds is then run in each period. At the beginning of a round 
the subject is asked to choose an arm. Given the subjects choice and the fixed 
and known probabilities, the subject's payoff is drawn. A random number is then 
drawn to- determine -if. the-·period-is to continue, -We--incorporate a computerized 
roulette wheel for the random draw of the stopping rule, this feature was used to 
reduce subject boredom and automatic responses. If the period continues a new 
round is run. If the period ends then a new period begins and new state variables 
are drawn (i.e. the types of the arm good or bad) the subject is informed that this 
is being done. The subject screen is provided below: 
· 
[Figure 1 here] 
7 
(f) Each subject plays the bandit problem for a maximum amount of time (60 minutes) 
or a maximum number of periods (5) whichever comes first. 
(g) Each subject repeats each period with the same parameters given at the beginning 
of the experimental session. 
3.4 Experimental Design Summary 
Table 2 lists the treatments, the associate optimal risk neutral cut point (c*), posterior 
probability prediction that arm B is a good type, and the expected increase in payoff 
(D) of using the optimal strategy over a myopic strategy, the continuation probability b, 
and the probability of high payoff with the good arm. We label each cell with a two digit 
code which we will use for distinguishing the treatments (e.g. hL means high b, and 1.ow 
g). 
[Table 2 here] 
4 Experimental Results 
The first part of this section will investigate the best cutpoint distribution for each Bandit 
problem and parameter set. The best cutpoint for a subject will be defined as the value c 
that is most consistent with a subject's observed choices. A strategy is most consistent 
if it has the smallest number of observed deviations. For example, consider a subject 
in Bandit Problem II who chooses B, A, B, A, when C(B) is 0, 0, 0, 1 respectively. A
strategy of c = 0 would imply that a deviation was made at the 4th choice since the 
c = 0 strategy would be to choose B. A strategy of c = 1 would imply that deviations
were made at the 1st and 3rd choices. So the strategy c = 0 is the most consistent of 
the two strategies c = 0 and c = 1. The second part will focus on uncovering behavioral 
strategies used by subjects. 
4.1 Aggregate Cutpoint Behavior 
We investigate the behavior of the cutpoints that best describe the period "behavior" 
of each participant. We take these best cutpoint estimates and then investigate their 
stationary within and across periods, their values across the Bandit Problems and how 
they vary with. the.environment. parameters .. For-example, Fig.ure 2 supplies decisions 
made by a subject in our experiments. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
In period 1 of the figure we find that any cut point less than 0 describes the choice 
pattern. For period 2 the best cutpoint is any number between - 1  and -2, while for period 
3 it is -1. We will use the midpoint of the period best cutpoint intervals for each subject 
to construct a cut point distribution to investigate "stationarity." 
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Observation 1 
Support 
The best cutpoints change across periods. 
The Hotelling T2 statistic to test the hypothesis that the cut­
points are the same for each period are provided below. We use 
this test since we have multiple observations per subject and this 
test does not require independence of the observations. The ta­
ble below shows that we can safely reject the hypothesis of equal 
cutpoints across periods in 5 of the 8 parameter sets. 
Bandit Problem I 
Parameter Set df F-stat Prob level 
f L ( 4, 16) 4.28 0.02 
f H ( 4 ,15) 1.87 0.17 
hL ( 4, 14) 10.12 0.00 
hH ( 4,15) 6.98 0.00 
Bandit Problem II 
Parameter Set df F-stat Prob level 
f L (4,10) 1.68 0.23 
f H ( 4,8) 2.53 0.12 
hL ( 4,7) 21.80 0.00 
hH ( 4,9) 8.31 0.00 
Next we consider the number of choices that are consistent with the best cutpoint for 
each subject. Specifically, for period T and subject i we have a best cutpoint cir described
by the choices made by the subject. For all n choices made by i in T, we determine the
ratio n = � where nir is the number of decision made by subject i in period T and nir n,T 
number of choices that coincide with the best cutpoint cir· 
Observation 2 
Support 
The single best cutpoint within a period, which is allowed 
to change across periods, selects a large percent of individual 
choices. 
The table below shows the aggregate (overall periods) mean, and 
standard deviation for each parameter set. The pooled results 
are used since there is not a significant difference in the per­
centage of consistent choices across periods for each paramete� 
set. 
Bandit Problem I 
Parameter Set n Standard Deviation n 
f L .95 .1 1 100 
f H .99 .05 95 
hL .90 .15 90 
hH .94 .12 95 
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Bandit Problem II 
Parameter Set n Standard Deviation n 
f L .93 .14 70 
f H .92 . 14 60 
hL .80 . 18 55 
hH .90 .15 65 
. If we now select a single best cutpoint for each subject, i .e., we select a best cutpoint 
ci for all the selections made by subject i, we can calculate 0 = � where ni is the
number of decisions made by subject i and ni is the number of choices predicted by ct. 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics for 0 over all periods and the last period 
(period 5). 
Bandit Problem I 
Period 5 All Periods 
Parameter Set 0 Standard Deviation 0 Standard Deviation 
f L .93 .13 .88 .12 
f H 1 .0 .. . .96 .05 
hL .89 .16 .85 .13 
hH .94 .15 .92 . 1 1  
Bandit Problem II 
Period 5 All Periods 
Parameter Set 0 Standard Deviation 0 Standard Deviation 
f L .89 .21 .85 .15 
f H .93 .08 .82 .1 1 
hL .82 .16 .71 .15 
hH .89 .15 .84 .16 
To summarize, we find that the best cutpoints are not stati�nary in that they tend 
to change across periods, however within a period the single best cutpoint estimates 
describe individual choices extremely well. 
Observation 3 
Support 
The best cutpoints within a period decreases as the g falls, or 
as b'· increases. The best cut points select a larger percentage of 
consistent choices in Bandit I than Bandit II. 
See tables used above. 
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0 bservation 4 The distribution of cutpoints are significantly different between 
Bandit Problems I and II. The cutpoint distribution is consistent 
with myopic behavior with Bandit Problem II but not for Bandit 
Problem I. 
Support Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of cutpoints and Table 3 
shows the descriptive statistics for these distributions for Ban­
dit Problems I and II. The t-statistics for the mean shows that 
there is a difference in cutpoints across the Bandit Problems. 
In addition, we can reject the hypothesis that the cutpoints are 
zero for Bandit Problem I but not for Bandit Problem II. 
[Table 3 about here] 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
In terms of the comparative static results, recall that for Bandit Problem II none 
of the parametric conditions ( 8, g, . . . ) should affect the optimal cutpoint which is 0. 
However, for Bandit Problem I the higher the probability that the period continues the 
lower the cutpoint; the higher the probability of the good type paying high the lower the 
cutpoint; and the less risk averse the subject the lower the cutpoint (all the statements 
are ceteris paribus of course). 
The following ANOVA model was estimated 
where 
CV = median cutpoint of each subject's period best cutpoint 
pg 
{
1 if probability that good type pays high payoff is .9. 
0 otherwise 
D9 
{
1 if probability period continues is .9 
0 otherwise 
P9D9 - interaction term for both variables 
x 
{ � 
if subject is experienced
otherwise 
r is a measureforrisk-aversion that we derive from the responses provided by subjects 
in the BDM portion of the experiments. Specifically, we use the following non-parametric 
estimate for a subject's risk aversion 
where 
1 1  
subject i's selling price for BDM lottery j 
risk neutral selling price of lottery j 
number of instances where x is true 
Thus Ti E [-4, 4] and Ti = 0 =}risk neutrality, and larger Ti show increasing risk aversion.6 
Observation 5 
Support 
While the direction of the parameter estimates correspond with 
the predictions, none of the effects are significant. 
Table 4 shows the estimates of the ANOVA. Only the constant 
term for Bandit Problem I is significant with all the parametric 
effects accounted for we find that the cutoff for Bandit Prob­
lem II is not significantly different than 0, but not for Bandit 
Problem I. 
[Table 4 about here] 
To summarize, the aggregate results show: 
• The best cut point choices select a large percent of the choices made by subjects.
• The percent of choices consistent with the best cutpoint is affected positively
by g and negatively by 8 in Bandit Problem I.
• Cutpoint choices in Bandit Problem II are consistent with myopic behavior,
whi.le they are not in Bandit Problem I.
• The underlying cutpoint distributions are not significantly affected by the g
and 8. However, the direction of change is consistent with the comparative
static predictions for Bandit Problem I.
• There is no significant correlation between the decision made in the BDM
mechanism and the cutpoints in the Bandit Problems.
• Experienced subjects have a slightly lower cutpoint in Bandit Problem I but
show no difference in Bandit Problem II.
The analysis provided in this section examined the best cutpoints per subject and 
then used these "estimates" to make aggregate statements about behavior. However, this 
method does not consider potential strategies that are employed by subjects in making 
their cutpoint decisions, since each estimate is subject specific. To determine which 
individual behavioral strategies best describe the data we estimate the likelihood that 
specific strategies describe the cutpoint decisions. 
4.2 Behavioral Strategies 
In the analysis above, allowing the cutpoint to change each period gave a better descrip­
tion of the data than not allowing the cutpoint to depend on the period. This should 
6We calculate two other measures based on the BDM responses which we supply in Appendix B.
In all cases the measures are consistent with subject risk aversion. Furthermore, none of the measures 
affect the results of our ANOVA estimates. 
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be expected since we are in essence adding more variables to the estimation procedure. 
But is the improvement in fit an adequate trade-off for the loss of parsimony or degrees 
of freedom? We address this question by utilizing a procedure developed by El-Gamal 
and Grether (1993). Their procedure finds the most likely collection of decision rules 
that best explain the behavior of experimental subjects. The procedure estimates the 
maximum likelihood collection of rules and chooses the best set based on an information 
criterion that penalizes the procedure for admitting more rules. 
Following their process, we construct a class of potential decision rules that could be 
used by subjects in our experiment. We construct a cut point decision rule as an initial 
cutpoint x, and a new cutpoint y in period z. Thus, the decision rules we-consider for a 
subject consists of three parts x/y/z: initial cutpoint x, new cutpoint y, and switching 
period z. For example the decision rule -2/1/4 means the subject 'starts with a cutpoint 
of -2 and then switches to a cutpoint of 1 at the start of period 4. The rules we will search 
over are where x E {-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2}, y E {-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2} and z = {2, 4, 6} (6 :::} 
initial cutpoint does not switch). In addition to these decision rules, we allow for errors 
( <:) so that the probability of not using a specified rule is part of the model; we restrict
€ E {0.01, 0.05, 0.10, . . .  , 0.50 }. It should be emphasized that the notion of error in this 
procedure describes the inability of the decision model to describe the choice, and does 
not necessarily reflect the errors that individuals make. 
Given the rules, environment parameters, and the allowable error rates, we calculate 
the likelihood function for each combination of k rules. That is, we restrict the search to 
finding the single "best" rule, the two best rules and so forth. We estimate the maximum 
likelihood collection of 1 rule; we then compute the Akaike information criterion (IC) 
that incorporates a penalty for the number of parameters in the model (the number of 
allowable rules). We then increase the number of rules by 1 and compute the IC, if 
the IC has decreased we stop; if it has increased we increase the number of rules by 1 
and continue. The set of rules with the highest IC is the best collection of rules for a 
particular parameter set. 
The estimates for the rules and errors for each experimental treatment are given in 
Appendix C. The tables report for each bandit problem and each parameter set the 
chosen rules, the likelihood value, and the IC for each k. 
We now summarize the results from the estimates found in Appendix C: 
13 
• For Bandit Problem II the best single rule for each parameter set is a station­
arity myopic strategy. Furthermore, as more rules are allowed, the stationary
myopic rule is always selected.
• For Bandit Problem I the best single rule is non-myopic except for parameter
set hH (a myopic strategy after period 1 )  .
• When we allow more rules to be selected, Bandit Problem I continually ad­
mits nonmyopic strategies, with the proportion of the myopic strategy selected
falling. Furthermore, more decision rules are selected for Bandit Problem I
(nonmyopic) than Bandit Problem II (myopic prediction).
• In Bandit Problem I, the proportion of nonmyopic strategies increases in the
direction the comparative static predictions suggest.
• For Bandit Problem I the error rate decreases as more rules are allowed to be
selected; for Bandit Problem II the error rate decreases slightly as more rules
are allowed to be selected.
The basic summary of results from this investigation of individual decision-rules are 
contained in the following observations: 
0 bservation 6 
Observation 7 
Behavior in Bandit Problem I is consistent with non-myopic sta­
tionary strategies. However, this non-myopic behavior has error 
rates of approximately 10 to 30%. 
Behavior in Bandit Problem II is consistent with myopic sta­
tionary strategies. However, the selected strategies have error 
rates of approximately 30 to 50. 
5 Conclusions 
Our research program presented above was very simple: design experiments to investigate 
individual decision-making behavior in two diverse but relatively simple bandit problems. 
Then, determine the pattern of behavior in the two environments.relative to the following 
theoretical predictions: 
1. Cutpoint behavior should be consistent with stationary cutpoint strategies for both
environments.
2. In one of the environments behavior should be consistent with myopic behavior
while the other should exhibit non-myopic behavior.
3. For various parameter choices (discount rates and probabilities of good outcomes)
the comparative static predictions should be neutral in the myopic case and impor­
tant in the non-myopic environment.
14 
The experimental results suggest that there are individual violations of stationarity 
in cutpoint behavior but that the most likely collection of decision rules that explains 
subject behavior are stationary strategies. For all the measures we used there is a clear 
distinct pattern in the two bandit environments: behavior is more myopic in the envi­
ronment in which that form of behavior was predicted. Furthermore, the most likely 
collection of decision rules shows this distinctive pattern convincingly. The comparative 
static results are not as significant but the "signs" on the estimates are as predicted. 
15 
Appendix A: Instructions 
Below is an abbreviated set of the 
computerized instructions we used. 
Screen 1: 
Instructions 
You are about to participate in an 
individual decision making experiment. The 
decisions you will make during the 
experiment will result in Dutch guilder profits 
that will be yours to keep. Thus, you should 
follow the instructions carefully to understand 
how you can make profits. In this experiment 
all values will be stated in terms of tokens. 
Each token you earn can be redeemed into 
guilders at a rate of __ tokens per Dutch 
guilder. The experiment will be broken-up 
into two different parts in which you make 
decisions and earn profits. 
<Press any key to continue> 
Screen 2: 
Instructions for Part 1 
In this portion of the experiment you will 
be asked a series of questions. Given the 
answer to the questions a spin of .a 
computerized roulette ·wheel· will i:Je made. 
Given your answer and the outcome of the 
roulette spin you will earn profits and proceed 
to part 2 of the experiment. 
We will now take you through an example 
of how decisions made during this part 
translates into profits. In questions 1 and 2 a 
roulette wheel containing the twenty numbers 
5, 1 0, 1 5, ... , 1 00 will be spun (all numbers are
equally likely to be selected). If the wheel 
selects a certain set of numbers you will 
receive nothing, if the wheel selects any 
number not in that set you will receive a fixed 
amount of tokens. You will then be asked 
how much you would be willing to sell this 
game for. The roulette wheel will then be 
spun and if the number the wheel selects is 
equal or greater than the price you asked, you 
will be paid that amount. If the number the 
wheel selects is less than the price you ask, 
you will play the game 
We will now go through several sample 
questions of this type so that you can see how 
it works. The outcomes of these sample 
questions will not count toward your profits; 
this is only for practice. 
<Press B to go back or any other key to 
continue> 
Screen 3: 
Practice Round 
In this game we will spin the roulette 
w h e e l  w i t h  t h e  t w e n t y  n u m b e r s  
5, 1 0,15, ... , 100. I f  a number less than or equal 
to 50 is selected you win nothing. If the 
number is greater than 50 you will receive 100 
tokens 
How much are you willing to accept instead 
of playing this game? 
..Please enter a number between 0 and 1 00. 
Given that you are asking __ , the roulette 
wheel will be spun and if it selects a number 
that is greater than the price you are asking 
you will be paid that amount. Otherwise you 
will play the game. 
** Random spin of the Roulette Wheel** 
The wheel landed on the number __ 
which is less than your asking price of __ . 
Thus, you must play the game. 
** Random spin of the Roulette Wheel** 
The wheel landed on the number __ 
which is less than or equal to __ so you 
win 0 tokens. 
<Press any key to continue> 
lll///ll/llllll I lllll **************************** llll///l II II I I I/I/I II I 
Bandit instructions 
l************************************************************************I 
[Bandit problem 1] 
Screen 1: 
Instructions for Part 2 
In part 2, the experiment will be broken up 
into __ periods. Each period in turn will be 
divided into rounds in which you will make 
decisions and earn profits. At the beginning 
of a round, you will make a choice between 
two alternatives called A and B. The A 
alternative will pay you __ tokens if you 
select it. The B alternative will be one of two 
possible types which we will call good and 
bad. If B is good, you will -.receive __ 
tokens with a specified chance and __ 
tokens with a specified chance. If B is bad, 
then your chance of obtaining __ tokens 
will be lower and the chance of obtaining 
__ tokens will be higher. After you select 
either alternative A or B you will be informed 
of your payoff for the round and the roulette 
wheel will be spun. If the wheel selects a 
certain set of numbers the period will go to 
the next round, otherwise the period will end 
and we will proceed to a new period. 
Before you go on to the experiment you 
will go through some practice periods. The 
outcomes of your decisions in these practice 
periods will not count toward your profits; 
they are only for practice. 
Screen 2: 
In round 1 ,  of each period of this 
experiment, the A alternative pays __ 
,tokens. The B -alternative could be a good 
type that pays __ tokens with a __ 
percent chance and __ tokens with a __ 
percent chance. This means, if B is good, 
then over many rounds you could expect to 
earn, on average __ tokens a round. On the 
other hand, B could be a bad type which pays 
__ tokens with a __ percent chance and 
or B you will be informed of your payoff for 
the round and the roulette wheel will be spun. 
If the wheel selects a certain set of numbers 
the period will go to the next round, otherwise 
the period will end and we will proceed to a 
new period. We will now take you through an 
example of how decisions made during this 
part translates into profits. The outcomes of 
your decisions in these instructions will not 
count toward your profits. This is only for 
practice. press any key to continue 
Screen 2: 
Suppose we are in period 1 ,  round 1 .  The 
alternatives A and B could be a good type that 
pays __ tokens with a __ percent chance, 
and __ tokens with a __ percent chance. 
This means that if A or B , is good, then over 
many rounds you could expect to earn , on 
average __ tokens a round if you always 
choose that alternative. On the other hand, A 
or B could be a bad type which pays __ 
tokens with , a __ percent chance and __ 
tokens with a __ percent chance. This 
means if A or B is bad, then over many 
rounds you could expect to earn , on average, 
__ tokens a round. Remember that you do 
not always have to make the same choice, at 
each round you may either choose A or B. 
You will be given information concerning the 
chance that A or B is a good or a bad type. 
Lastly, the chance that a period will continue 
after the current round is __ percent. That 
means that, on average, in any round in a 
period, you could expect the period to last 
more rounds. Further information will 
be handed out to you. 
<Press B to go ·back or any other· key to 
continue> 
Screen 3: 
We now summarize the specific features of 
this practice period: 
1 .  At the beginning of a period, the A 
alternative will be selected as eithe,r a good 
type or a bad type. It will remain that type for 
the entire period. 
2. At the beginning of a period, the B
alternative will be selected as either a good 
type or a bad type. It will remain that type 
for the entire period. 
3. The chance that alternative A is good is
__ percent. 
4. The chance that alternative B is good is
__ percent. 
5. If A or B is good it will pay __ tokens
with a __ percent chance and __ tokens 
with a __ percent chance. 
6. The chance that the period continues at the
end of the round is __ percent. 
A sheet with this information will be given 
to you. 
<Press B to go back or any other key to 
continue> 
Screen 4: 
Before you begin the practice period, there 
are several features of the program that may 
be helpful. At anytime you can press h to see 
the history of your choices and the outcomes. 
The screen always shows the payoff chances 
under a good type and the payoff chances for 
.. a bad.type. _If }'.au.understand the process and 
want to practke press enter, otherwise raise 
your hand and a monitor will answer your 
questions. 
<Press B to go back or any other key to 
practice> 
__ tokens with a __ percent chance. , This 
means if B is bad, then over many rounds you 
could expect to earn , on average, __ tokens 
a round. You will be given information 
concerning the chance that B is a good or a 
bad type. Lastly, the chance that a period will 
continue after the current round is __ 
percent. That means that, on average, in any 
round in a period, , you could expect the 
period to last __ more rounds. Further 
information will be handed out to you; 
<Press B to go back or any other key to 
continue> 
Screen 3: 
We now summarize the specific features 
of this experiment: 
1. Alternative A pays __ tokens. ,
2. At the beginning of a period, the B
alternative will be selected as either a good 
type or a bad type with a fixed chance. It will 
remain that type for the entire period. 
3. The chance that B is good is __ percent.
4. If B is good it will pay __ tokens with a
__ percent chance and __ , tokens with a 
__ percent chance in the first iteration of 
each, period. 
5. If B is bad it will pay __ tokens with a
__ percent chance and __ , tokens with a 
__ percent chance. 
6. The chance that.the period continues at the
end of the round is __ percent., 
7. Your conversion rate is 1 Guilder for
tokens. 
<Press B to go back or any other key to 
continue> 
Screen 4: 
Before you begin the practice period, there 
are several features of the program that may 
be helpful. At any time you can press 'H' to 
see the history of your choices and the 
outcomes. The screen always shows the 
payoff chances under a good type and the 
payoff chances for a bad type. 
If you understand the process and want to 
practice press Enter, otherwise raise your 
hand and an experimenter dude will answer 
your questions. 
There will be 2 practice periods. 
<Press B to go back or any other key to 
practice> 
/*********************************** 
***********************************/ 
Bandit Problem 2 
Screen 1: 
Instructions for Part 2 
In part 2, the experiment will be broken 
up into periods. Each period in tum will be 
divided into rounds in which you will make 
decisions and earn profits. At the beginning 
of a round, you will make a choice between 
two alternatives called A and B. Alternatives 
A and B will be one of two possible types 
which we will call good and bad. A and B 
.may be the .same.or different types. If your 
choice (A or B) is good, you will receive__ 
tokens with a specified chance, and __ 
tokens with a specified chance. If your choice 
(A or B), is bad, then your chance of 
obtaining __ tokens will be lower and, the 
chance of obtaining __ tokens will be 
higher. After you select either alternative A 
Appendix B 
Three alternative measures of tisk tolerance using data from the BDM procedure in 
our experiments are desctibed below. 
Let Lj {lj, pj, hj) denote the lottery j where you receive the amount lj with probability ( 1-pj); 
you receive hj with probability Pj . 
The distribution of the selling piice of the lottery L(0,.5, 100) we used in the experiment is 
provided below (risk neutral response= 50):
BDM Responses to L(O,.S, 100) 
45 
40 
35 
30 
25 
Frequency% 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
0 1 0 20 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 , 00 
Measures: 
1 .  Non-parametlic statistic: 
Elicited Value 
For each subject i we calculate the statistic 
where Sij =subject i's selling price for lottery j 
S1:j = tisk neutral selling p1ice of lottery j 
#0 =number of instances in which the condition· is true 
l'i = 0 : 1isk neutral behavior 
rj > 0 : "1isk loving" behavior 
l'i < 0 : "1isk averse" behavior
2. Median ratio log statistic:
l'i = medianj [ln(Uvj)/ln(Usj)] -- {median over the j lotteries for subject i} 
where 
Uvj = (S1:j - lj)/(hj - lj) -- {normalized utility of risk neutral value of 
lollery j} 
U sj = (S j - 1 j)/(h j - 1 j) -- { nmmalized utility of i's selling price for · · · · · 
lottery j} 
l'i = 1 : 1isk neutral hchavior 
ri < 1 : 1isk loving hchavior 
rj > 1 : risk averse behavior 
3. Median of selling p1ices 
I"i = median or Sj selling p1iccs for subject i 
The median tisk neutral selling price is 52.5. Thus ri < 52.5 implies risk averse 
behavior and l'i > 52.5 shows more risk loving hehavior. 
The table below supplies the descriptive statistics for each of the measures described 
above. 
Measure mean standard minimum maximum median n 
deviation 
non- -.38 2.05 -4 4 - 1  1 26 
parametdc 
median 1.99 6.51 .13 59.9 .87 1 26 
ratio log 
median of 49.9 1 7.92 () 1 ()() 50 1 26 
selling 
prices 
Finally, in the tahle below we provide condutions between the three measures of risk 
attitude and the selling price or the L(O, .5, I 00) lollery. 
non-parametric 
median ratio log 
median of selling prices 
L(O, .5, 100)
1 .00 
0.37 
0;84 
0.45 
o.:n 
� .(){.) 
·0.45 
0.35 
0.84 
0.45 
1-:00 
0. 90 
0.77 
0.35 
0.90 
1.00 
Appendix C 
# rules 
1 
2 
3 
4 
* * *5 
Estimates of Rule Classification Procedure 
Legend 
eps error rate 
rules initial cutpoint/ delta cutpoint 
round switch 
IC information criteria 
Bandit Problem I 
parameter file: rate = .8 and g = . 7 
# subjects = 20.0000 
eps rules (#) likelihood 
0.35 -2.0/ 0.0/ 4 20 5.77 x 10-94 
0.25 0-0/ 0.0/ 6 10 3.36 x 10-7B 
-3.0/-1.0/ 4 10 
0.25 0.0/ 0.0/ 6 7 5.65 x 10-74 
-3.0/-1.0/ 4 10 
-3.0/ 0.0/ 2 3 
0.25 -3.o /-3.o / 6 7 1.36 x 10-10 
0.0/ 0.0/ 6 6 
-3.0/ 0.0/ 4 4 
-3.0/ 0.0/ 2 3 
0.20 1 -3.0/-3.0/ 6 5 5.53 x 10-67 
-2.0/-2.0/ 6 3 
0.0/ 0.0/ 6 6 
-3.0/-1.0/ 4 3 
-3.0/ 0.0/ 2 3 
22 
IC 
-95.36 
-81. 71 
-79.61 
-78.35 
-76.86 
# rules 
1 
2 
3 
* * *4 
5 
# rules 
1 
2 
3 
* * *4 
5 
parameter file: rate = .8 and g = .9 
# subjects = 19 
eps rules (#) likelihood 
0.25 -1.0/-1.0/ 6 19 7.12 x 10-77 
0.15 -3.0/-2.0/ 2 1 1  3.38 x 10-61 
0.0/-1.0/ 4 8 
0.15 -2.0/-2.0/ 6 8 1.47 x 10-53 
-1.0/-1.0/ 6 6 
0.0/ 0.0/ 6 5 
0.10 7 -3.0/-2.0/4 7 1.33 x 10-47 
-3.0/-1.0/ 2 6 
-1.0/ 0.0/ 4 3 
0.0/-1.0/ 4 3 
0.10 -3.0/-3.0/ 6 4 1 .33 x 10-47 
-2.0/-2.0/ 6 4 
-3.0/-1.0/ 2 5 
-1.0/ 0.0/ 4 3 
0.0/-1.0/ 4 3 
parameter file: rate = .9 and g = . 7 
# subjects = 18 
eps rules (#) likelihood 
0.40 -1.0/ 0.0/ 4 18 1.22 x 10-161
0.30 -2.0/-1.0/ 2 14 3.74 x 10-138
1.0/ 0.0/ 2 4 
0.30 -2.0/-1.0/ 4 13 7.03 x 10-133
-1.0/ 0.0/ 4 2 
1.0/ 0.0/ 2 3 
0.30 -3.0/-2.0/4 9 7 .24 x 10-130
-2.0/-1.0/ 4 4 
-1.0/ 0.0/ 4 2 
1.0/ 0.0/ 2 3 
0.25 -3;0/-3.0/ 6 7 3.3G x 1-0-128
-3.0/ 0.0/ 4 3 
-2.0/-1.0/ 4 2 
0.0/-1.0/ 2 3 
1.0/ 0.0/ 2 3 
23 
IC 
-78.27 
-64.71 
-59.19 
-55.36 
-57.48 
IC 
-163.04 
-141.67 
-138.52 
-137.62 
-138.-08 
# rules 
1 
2 
3 
* * *4 
5 
parameter file: rate = .9 and g = .9 
#subjects = 19 
eps rules (#) likelihood 
0.25 -1.0/0.0/2 19 7.13 x 10-140 
0.20 -1 .0/-1.0/6 17 6.03 x 10-119 
-3.0/1.0/2 2 
0.20 -1.0/-1.0/6 13 2.33 x 10-110 
0.0/-3.0/4 4 
1.0/0.0/4 2 
0.20 -1.0/-1.0/6 12 1.38 x 10-105 
-3.0/0.0/2 3 
-3.0/1.0/2 1 
0.0/-3.0/4 3 
0.15 -1.0/-1.0/6 1 1  1.80 x 10-103 
-3.0/-1 .0/4 2 
-3.0/0.0/2 2 
-3.0/1.0/2 1 
0.0/-3.0/4 3 
24 
IC 
-141.27 
-122.46 
- 1 15.99 
-113.34 
- 1 13.35 
# rules 
1 
2 
* * *3 
4 
# rules 
1 
* * *2 
3 
Bandit Problem II 
parameter file: rate = .8 and g = . 7 
#subjects = 14.0000 
eps r rules (#) likelihood 
0.40 0.0/0.0/6 14 7.33 x 10-68 
0.35 0.0/0.0/6 13 7.96 x 10-64 
-1.0/-3.0/4 1 
0.30 0.0/0.0/6 1 1  3.17 x 10-60 
-1.0/-3.0/4 1 
2.0/-1.0/4 2 
0.30 0.0/0.0/6 10  1.02 x 10-5s 
-2.0/0.0/4 1 
-1.0/-3.0/4 1 
2.0/-1.0/4 2 
parameter file: rate = .8 and g = .9 
#subjects= 12 
eps r rules (#) likelihood 
0.40 0.0/0.0/6 12 7.23 x 10-64 
0.35 0.0/-3.0/4 2 7.00 x 10-59 
2.0/0.0/2 10  
0.35 -3.0/0.0/4 3 7.34 x 10-57 
0.0/-3.0/4 1 
2.0/0.0/2 8 
25 
IC 
-69.26 
-67.34 
-65.86 
-66.47 
IC 
-65.26 
-62.40 
-62.50 
# rules 
1 
* * *2 
3 
# rules 
1 
* * *2 
3 
parameter file: rate = .9 and g = . 7 
#subjects = 1 1  
eps r rules (#) likelihood 
0.50 0.0/0.0/6 1 1  1 .98 x 10-144 
0.50 0.0/0.0/6 8 9.46 x 10-138 
2.0/-2.0/2 3 
0.50 0.0/0.0/6 7 2.55 x 10-136
0.0/-3.0/4 2 
2.0/-2.0/2 2 
parameter file: rate= .9 and g = .9 
#subjects = 13 
eps r rules (#) likelihood 
0.40 2.0/0.0/2 13  2.93 x 10-112
0.35 -3.0/0.0/2 5 5.02 x 10-104
2.0/0.0/2 8 
0.35 0.0/0.0/6 8 2.37 x 10-103
-3.0/0.0/2 2 
2.0/0.0/2 3 
26 
IC 
-145.82 
-141 .27 
-141.95 
IC 
-1 13.65 
-107.54 
-108.99 
Table 1 .  Probability of Period End and Expected 
Number of Rounds 
Chance Period Will Last 6=.8 6=.9 
5 more rounds 32 out of 100 59 out of 100 
10 more rounds 10 out of 100 34 out of 100 
15 more rounds 3 out of 100 20 out of 100 
30 more rounds 1 out of 100 4 out of 100 
Expected # of rounds 
per period 5 10 
Table 2 .  Parametric Treatment Conditions 
parameter 6 g c optimal D 
Set Name Posterior 
£1 .8 .7 0.5 .32 10 
f H .8 .9 0.5 .20 30 
hL .9 .7 - 1  .23 40 
hH .9 .9 0.5 .12 60 
Table 3. Best Cutpoint Estimates 
Problem Mean Standard Deviation Median t-statistic 
Bandit I -.8 1.6 -.5 -5.2 
Bandit II 0 1.5 0 -0.7 
27 
Table 4. ANOVA Estimates and Hypothesis Tests 
Variable Bandit Problem II Bandit Problem II 
constant -.492* 0.009 
pg - .221 -. 146 
D9 -.082 .075 
P9D9 .338 .110 
Exp er -.212 .027 
risk .008 -.001 
# of 
observations 76 50 
• Significant at the .05 level of significance.
H0 : parameters have no effect 
Bandit Problem I Bandit Problem II 
F-Stat. .970 .414 
Prob. .412 .744 
28 
Fig ure 1 .  S u bject S creen Layout 
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